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Abstract
We consider the restriction of classical principles like Excluded Middle, Markov’s Principle,
König’s Lemma to arithmetical formulas of degree 2. For any such principle, we find simple
mathematical statements which are intuitionistically equivalent to it, provided we restrict universal
quantifications over maps to computable maps.
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1. Introduction
We continue the study, started in [1,10], of intuitionistic equivalents of classical
principles like the Excluded Middle, Markov’s Principle, König’s Lemma. This is the
intuitionistic counterpart of Reverse Mathematics (see [9]): “given the theorems, find out
the minimum of axioms required to prove them”. We look for the minimum of assumptions
in Classical Logic required to prove a given classical principle in (full) Intuitionistic
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Arithmetic.1 With respect to previous works in Intuitionistic Reverse Mathematics by
Ishihara [6], we refine our analysis to really weak instances of classical principles, having
second order universal quantifications over maps restricted to effectively given families
of recursive maps. These statements can be expressed by first order quantifications ∀x ∈
N.A( f (x, .)), for some recursive map f . We propose for this topic the name “Refined”
Intuitionistic Reverse Mathematics. Here “Refined” means: with universal quantification
over maps restricted to computable maps. The same refinement, but in the context of
Classical Mathematics, has been considered by Kohlenbach [7].
Motivating “Refined” Intuitionistic Reverse Mathematics. This line of research is
motivated by a work in progress, the constructive interpretation of Classical Arithmetic
using Limits [5,3]. In the Limit interpretation, the restrictions of the Excluded Middle
and König’s Lemma to degree n formulas may be proved using limit constructions.
In the same way, the extension of the Markov Principle to degree n formulas is also
provable by a Limit construction. We think of Limit constructions as constructions of a
new kind. We are interested in minimizing, both in number and in logical complexity,
the constructions of a new kind that we are forced to use while interpreting Classical
Mathematics. Therefore we investigate which constructions, in the usual meaning of the
word, we may get by using, as oracles, the new constructions we have for König’s Lemma
or the Markov Principle. In other words, we make a quotient of mathematical theorems
up to provability in Intuitionistic Arithmetic. Then we ask ourselves which theorems are
in the same equivalence class as König’s Lemma or as the Markov Principle (respectively,
restricted and extended to degree n formulas). Most theorems that we found are restrictions
to recursive maps of theorems found in [6]. All can be expressed as first order formulas
∀x ∈ N.A( f (x, .)), for some recursive map f .
What we already know about degree 1 formulas. Call the versions of the Excluded
Middle, Markov Principle, König’s Lemma for degree 1 formulas 1-EM, 1-Markov,
1-König (Section 2.1). Several intuitionistic equivalences between mathematical theorems
in frequent use, on one hand (provided we “refine” universal quantifications on maps
to computable maps), and 1-EM, 1-Markov, 1-König, on the other hand, are already
known [1,10]. For instance, the principle of monotone convergence (every weakly
increasing sequence of rational numbers having an upper bound has a limit), restricted
to recursive sequences, is intuitionistically equivalent to 1-EM. The Maximum Theorem
and Intermediate Value Theorem (all uniformly continuous functions over [0, 1] have a
maximum, and a zero in the case f (0) ≤ 0 ≤ f (1)), restricted to recursive maps f , are
both intuitionistically equivalent 1-König.
Going up to degree 2. Call the versions of the Excluded Middle, Markov Principle,
König’s Lemma for degree 2 formulas 2-EM, 2-Markov, 2-König. The principles that we
get in this way are more abstract than those for degree 1 formulas. In spite of this, in this
case there are also some intuitionistic equivalences with relevant mathematical principles
and results (with universal quantifications restricted to recursive elements). The Bolzano–
Weierstrass Theorem in Analysis (every sequence of rational numbers over [0, 1] has some
1 In Classical Reverse Mathematics, the goal is instead finding the minimum of axioms required to prove a
given classical principle in an elementary (second order) extension of arithmetic + classical reasoning.
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limit point), as usual restricted to recursive sequences, is intuitionistically equivalent to
2-König. The Superior Limit Principle (every sequence of rational numbers over [0, 1] has
a superior limit), restricted to recursive sequences, is intuitionistically equivalent to 2-EM.
For both results we refer the reader to [10].
We found some new equivalences, which show that the versions of the Excluded Middle,
Markov Principle, König’s Lemma for degree 2 formulas are also frequently needed in
mathematical proofs.
Some examples of the results of this paper. 2-EM is equivalent to the principle that any
effectively decidable set is either finite or infinite. 2-König is equivalent to one version of
Dickson’s Lemma (for recursive sequences), and to Stolzenberg’s Principle for recursive
sequences (all recursive sequences over {0, 1} have either infinitely many 0’s or infinitely
many 1’s). 2-Markov is equivalent to: any effectively decidable set which is not infinite
is finite, and to: every recursive sequence over N which does not change value infinitely
many times is stationary. Another question, raised by S. Valentini, from Sambin’s school
of Formal Topology in Padua, was whether the Contrapositive of Choice is derivable in
intuitionistic logic. We settle this question negatively in 5.5. In this case, we do not provide
an equivalence with some classical principle in the previous list, but only an upper and a
lower bound.
About our formal system. We derive our equivalences inside H ω A (Intuitionistic
Arithmetic with function quantifiers). The language of H ω A includes constants for natural
numbers, one constant for each primitive recursive function or predicate, quantifications
over integers and functions. We define ∆0ω, the set of arithmetical predicates, consisting
of all predicates with no function variables and no quantifications over functions. We call
all sets and relations over N defined by some arithmetical predicate: arithmetical sets and
relations. We define Σ 0n ,Π 0n and degree n formulas as subsets of ∆0ω.
The axioms of H ω A are defining axioms for primitive recursive functions and
predicates, induction, and Dependent Choice for arithmetical predicates and relations (with
no second order variables).
Dependent Choice may be formulated as follows. Let X be any arithmetical set, and R
be any arithmetical relation (with possibly integer variables, but no second order variables).
Assume that for all x ∈ X there is some y ∈ X such thatR(x, y). Then, given any x0 ∈ X
there is some sequence {xn}n∈N such that R(xn, xn+1) for all n ∈ N . If X, R are the
arithmetical definitions of X ,R, then Dependent Choice is the formal statement
(∀x .X (x) ⇒ ∃y.X (y) ∧ R(x, y)) ⇒
X (x0) ⇒
(∃ f. f (0) = x0 ∧ ∀x .X ( f (x)) ∧ R( f (x), f (x + 1)).
Dependent Choice implies Choice for arithmetical predicates. This latter is the
following statement. If for all x there is a y such that P(x, y, z), then there is a map f
selecting y = f (x):
(∀z) ∀x .∃y.P(x, y, z) ⇒ ∃ f.∀x .P(x, f (x), z).
Dependent Choice is a predicative axiom. If we add to H ω A some classical
principle concerning arithmetical formulas, we will be able to define some arithmetical,
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non-recursive functions through Dependent Choice. However, no impredicative definitions
will be possible: they would require both Dependent Choice and the Excluded Middle
extended to atomic predicates with function variables.
The plan of the paper. In Section 2 we list the logical and mathematical principles, which
are the subject of this paper. In Section 3, we prove equivalences between logical principles
and infinity axioms. In Section 4, we prove equivalences between logical principles and
principles about quasi-well-ordering, including several versions of Dickson’s Lemma. In
Section 5, we prove equivalences between logical principles, principles about convergent
sequences over N , and the Contrapositive of Choice.
2. The Excluded Middle for degree 2 formulas, and related principles
In this section we list the principles which are the subject of this paper. We divide them
into four subgroups:
• Section 2.1. Logical principles for degree 2 formulas: the Excluded Middle, König’s
Lemma, Markov’s principle.
• Section 2.2. Infinity axioms (all quite weak).
• Section 2.3. Equivalences among the different definitions of quasi-well-ordering [9];
Dickson’s Lemma [8].
• Section 2.4. Convergence principles over N [3], Contrapositive of Choice.
In order to make the paper self-contained, each principle is described in detail. Now we
explain how we will write down the axiom schemas.
Families of recursive maps and sets. We will often speak of recursive families A,B of
n-ary recursive predicates and n-ary recursive functions. In this case, we in fact mean that
there is a single (n + 1)-ary recursive predicate P and recursive map f , whose instances
P(x, .) and f (x, .) are an enumeration of A,B. Informally: A = {P(x, .)|x ∈ N} and
B = { f (x, .)|x ∈ N}.
Axioms schemas. Let A,B as above. When describing an axiom schema, we will
sometimes write: ∀Q ∈ A.C[Q], ∀g ∈ B.D[g]. We consider this just as an abbreviation
for the axiom schemas: ∀x .C[P(x, .)], ∀x .D[ f (x, .)], with x a fresh variable.
Alternatively, we will sometimes write the schemas above making explicit the
enumerating predicate P (the enumerating function f ), but skipping, for the sake of
readability, the ∀x in front: C[P(x, .)], D[ f (x, .)]. This version is equivalent to the
previous one, because an axiom with a free variable x derives the same axiom with a
∀x in front.
2.1. The Excluded Middle, Markov Principle and König’s Lemma for degree 2 statements
In this section we introduce the versions of some classical principles for degree 2
formulas.
1-Markov, 2-Markov. We call the Double Negation schema ¬¬A ⇒ A for all A ∈ Σ 0n
(with possibly free variables) the n-Markov Principle or n-Markov, for short. 1-Markov is
the schema
(∀y.) ¬¬∃x .P(x, y) ⇒ ∃x .P(x, y)
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for any recursive P . In this schema, the formula ¬¬∃x .P(x, y) may be replaced with
the intuitionistically equivalent formula: ¬∀x .¬P(x, y). 1-Markov says: if f is a partial
recursive map and the computation of f (x) does not continue forever, then it terminates.
2-Markov is the schema
(∀z.) ¬¬∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z) ⇒ ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z)
for any recursive P . 2-Markov says: if f is a partial map recursive w.r.t. the Halting
Problem, and the computation of f (x) does not continue forever, then it terminates.
2-Markov implies 1-Markov by adding dummy quantifiers.
Dual of a positive formula. Call any formula which is ⇒-free, and whose only
negations are over atomic predicates, a “positive formula”. We call the formula A⊥ obtained
by switching each atomic predicate with its negation, ∨ with ∧, and ∃ with ∀, the dual
of a positive formula A. We have (A⊥)⊥ = A, and A⊥ ⇒ ¬A, but the converse is
only classical. If A(z) ∈ Σ 02 then A(z) = ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z) for some P recursive, and
A(z)⊥ = ∀x .∃y.¬P(x, y, z).
Lemma 2.1. For any A(z) = ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z) ∈ Σ 02 , 1-Markov implies: ¬A(z) ⇒
A(z)⊥.
Proof. ¬A(z) implies ∀x .¬∀y.P(x, y, z). This latter implies ∀x .∃y.¬P(x, y, z) by
1-Markov.
0-EM, 1-EM, 2-EM. We call the Excluded Middle schema A ∨ ¬A for all A ∈ Σ 0n ,
n-EM. n-EM implies n-Markov. 0-EM is intuitionistically provable. 1-EM is equivalent to
the schema
(∀y.) ∃x .P(x, y) ∨ ∀x .¬P(x, y)
for any P recursive. 2-EM is equivalent to the schema A(z) ∨ A(z)⊥ for any A(z) ∈ Σ 02 .
That is, 2-EM is equivalent to
(∀z.) ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z) ∨ ∀x .∃y.¬P(x, y, z)
for any recursive P . For a proof of this latter equivalence, remark that 2-EM implies
1-Markov. Thus, 2-EM implies ¬A(z) ⇒ A(z)⊥. For the converse, we use the fact that
A(z)⊥ ⇒ ¬A(z) is intuitionistic. 1-EM says: we can decide the Halting Problem for the
set of partial recursive maps. 2-EM says: we can decide the Halting problem for the set of
partial maps, which are themselves recursive w.r.t. the Halting Problem.
1-König, 2-König. Fix any integer n > 0. König’s Lemma says: all infinite binary trees
have some infinite branch. We call the schema (with an implicit ∀z. in front)
∀x, y.P(x, z) ∨ Q(y, z) ⇒ ∀x .P(x, z) ∨ ∀y.Q(y, z)
for any P, Q ∈ Σ 0n−1, n-König’s Lemma. This principle is equivalent to saying: if
a Σ 0n−1 binary tree is infinite, then either the left-hand side or the right-hand side is
infinite. 1-König refers to recursive trees, 2-König to recursively enumerable trees. Using
Dependent Choice, from n-König’s Lemma we may intuitionistically prove that all Σ 0n−1
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infinite binary trees have some infinite branch. This is the usual formulation of König’s
Lemma.2
The logical principles we listed form, w.r.t. intuitionistic provability, an ordering which
was investigated in [1]. 2-EM implies 2-König and 2-Markov, and these latter imply
1-EM. 1-EM implies both 1-König and 1-Markov, and these latter imply 0-EM (which is
intuitionistically provable). No implication between any two of the previous principles is
intuitionistically provable, but those listed above (see [1]). In particular, no axiom schema
above, but 0-EM, is intuitionistically provable. However, all of them are intuitionistically
validated by some limit construction in the limit interpretation of Classical Arithmetic. The
stronger the principle is intuitionistically, the more involved the limit interpretation is.
2.2. Infinity axioms
In this subsection we consider very weak infinity axioms: “every set is finite or infinite”,
“either a set or its complement in N is infinite”, “if a set if not infinite, then it is finite”. We
restrict them to recursive families of recursive sets, in order to get equivalences with weak
classical principles.
Finite and infinite sets of natural numbers. If P is any recursive predicate, we say that
“P is finite” if P is included in [0, x − 1] for some x ∈ N ; that is,
∃x .∀y.(¬(y ≥ x) ∨ ¬P(y)).
We say that “P is infinite” in the dual case:
∀x .∃y.(y ≥ x ∧ P(y))
“P is finite” is Σ 02 , while “P is infinite” is Π
0
2 . Let F ,F1, . . . ,Fn denote generic
recursive families of recursive subsets of N . Let G denote any recursive family of infinite
recursive sequences over {0, 1}. We will now define some axiom schemas parametric over
F ,F1, . . . ,Fn,G.
The “finite/infinite” principle. ∀P ∈ F , P is either finite or infinite. This is equivalent
to saying: ∀ f ∈ G, f has either finitely many 0’s, or infinitely many 0’s. We will check
that this principle is equivalent to 2-EM.
Stolzenberg’s Principle. We call the statement: ∀ f ∈ G, f has either infinitely many
0’s, or infinitely many 1’s, Stolzenberg’s Principle. Equivalently: ∀P ∈ F , either P is
infinite, or N − P is infinite (or both are). Equivalently again: ∀P1 ∈ F1, . . . , Pn ∈ Fn ,
if P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pn is infinite then Pi is infinite for some i . (Proof. ⇒. It is enough to
prove the case n = 2. Fix some infinite list L of elements of P1 ∪ P2. Either L includes
infinitely many elements of P1, or infinitely many elements of N − P1. In the second
case, since L ⊆ P1 ∪ P2, there are infinitely many elements in L ∩ P2. ⇐. Choose
n = 2, P1 = P, P2 = (N − P). Then N = P1 ∪ P2 is infinite; therefore either P or N − P
is.) We will check that this principle is equivalent to 2-König.
2 Proof (in the case n = 1). Fix any infinite recursive binary tree T . Let X be the set of nodes of T having
infinitely many children, R be the father/child relation, and x0 be the root of X . By assumption, x0 ∈ X . By
1-König, for all x ∈ X there is some y ∈ X such that x is the father of y. Applying Dependent Choice, we deduce
that there is some infinite sequence {xn}n∈N , starting from the root, and such that xn is the father of xn+1, for all
n ∈ N . We conclude that T has some infinite branch.
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Not-Infinity axiom. ∀P ∈ F , if P is not infinite then P is finite. We will check that this
principle is equivalent to 2-Markov.
Finite/infinite implies both Stolzenberg and Not-Infinite, but the converse does not hold.
For instance, if we find out that N − P is infinite, using Stolzenberg we cannot in general
decide whether P is infinite or not.
2.3. Quasi-well-ordering and Dickson’s Lemma
In this subsection we introduce alternative definitions of quasi-well-ordering [9], and
we consider the problem of their equivalence from an intuitionistic viewpoint.
Fix any recursive (weak) ordering (I,≤). A sequence a over I is any map either with
domain [0, n − 1], or with domain N , and with codomain I . In the first case we speak of
a finite sequence, in the second one of an infinite sequence. From now on, if x is in the
domain of a, we denote a(x) also by ax . We say that a′ is a subsequence of a, and we
write a′  a, if a′ is obtained by possibly skipping some elements of a. Formally, a′  a
if a′ = a◦ f , for some strictly increasing f , with dom( f ) = [0, m − 1] or dom( f ) = N .
Definition 2.2. (I,≤) is a quasi-well-ordering if every infinite sequence over I has some
weakly increasing subsequence of length 2:
∀s : N → I. ∃x, y. (x < y) ∧ (sx ≤ sy).
We list now some alternative definitions of quasi-well-ordering in Classical Mathemat-
ics, together with their restriction to recursive sequences. These restrictions will be equiv-
alent to weak classical principles.
Minimum subsequence principle. All s : N → I have some infinite subsequence t
having a minimum:
∀s : N → I. ∃t . (t  s) ∧ ∃x . ∀y. (tx ≤ ty).
Equivalently, there is some sx such that sx ≤ sz for infinitely many z: ∃x .∀y.∃z.(z ≥
y) ∧ (sx ≤ sz).
Infinite subsequence principle. All s : N → I have some infinite weakly increasing
subsequence t (we skip the ∀s : N → I in front, for short):
∃t . (t  s) ∧ ∀x, y. (x < y ⇒ tx ≤ ty).
Finite base principle. All s : N → I have some finite subset whose upward closure
includes s:
∀s : N → I. ∃x1, . . . , xn. ∀x . ∃i ≤ n. (sxi ≤ sx ).
{x1, . . . , xn} are called a finite base of s. Any of the previous principles may be taken as the
classical definition of quasi-well-ordering [9].3 The equivalence, however, requires second
order Classical Arithmetic. Let F denote a generic recursive family of infinite recursive
3 Apparently, the definitions of quasi-well-ordering and minimum sequence, infinite sequence (in the
unbounded versions) are arranged on order of increasing strength. Finite base has, however, no evident relation
with the previous ones.
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sequences over (I,≤). For all of the previous principles there is a version restricted to
recursive maps, obtained by replacing ∀s : N → I. with ∀s ∈ F .
In Section 4 we will prove that, if (I,≤) is a quasi-well-ordering, the restricted versions
of minimum sequence, infinite sequence, finite base are equivalent in some case to 1-EM,
in some other to 2-König. As a particular case, we will study the classical equivalents of
several versions of Dickson’s Lemma (restricted to recursive sequences).
Dickson’s Lemma (for recursive sequences). Assume that (I,≤) is Nk with the
componentwise ordering. Then all (unrestricted) principles above are alternative statements
of (unrestricted) Dickson’s Lemma (DL for short). In particular:
• “Nk is a quasi-well-ordering” is the constructive version of DL [8].
• The first step in the classical proof of DL is, usually, a proof of “infinite subsequence”
for Nk .
• “Finite base” for Nk is the most popular version of DL.
Minimum subsequence for Nk is, as far as we know, just a trick we are using in this
paper. In Algebra, DL may be restated as follows. Let Q be the field of rational numbers.
All ideals of the polynomial ring Q[x1, . . . , xk], having a base made only of monomials
have some finite base. When expressed in this way, DL is a particular case of the Hilbert
Base Theorem, which says: all ideals of the polynomial ring K [x1, . . . , xk], for any field
K , have some finite base.
2.4. Convergence principles and Contrapositive of Choice
Let s be any recursive sequence over N . We consider some (intuitionistically alternative)
notion of convergence for s, taken from [3].
“s is stationary (with stationary value L)” is the statement: for some n ∈ N and all
m ∈ N we have either m < n or sn = sm(= L). That is: we have sn = sm(= L) from
m = n on. The statement “s is stationary (with value L)” is Σ 02 if s is recursive.
“s is convergent (with limit value L)” is the statement: for all recursive φ : N → N
there is some n such that s is constant (constantly L) over [n, φ(n)]. Any stationary value
is a limit value, but the converse is only classical (see [3]).
“s is divergent” is the statement dual of stationarity: for all n there is some m such that
m ≥ n and s(n) = s(m). The statement “s is divergent” is Π 02 if s is recursive.
Comparing several notions of convergence. “s stationary”, “s convergent”, “¬¬ (s
stationary)”, “ ¬ (s divergent)” are alternative notions of convergence for sequences.
Classically (see later), they are all equivalent.
From an intuitionistic viewpoint, the first notion of convergence is too strong. There are
recursive families of recursive stationary sequences for which we cannot intuitionistically
prove stationarity. The third and the fourth notions are too weak: if we know that s is
¬¬-stationary, or ¬ (s divergent), we know almost nothing about the behavior of s.
The second notion of convergence is equivalent to the no-counterexample interpretation
of stationarity. It looks like the correct intuitionistic counterpart of stationarity. It is used
in [3] to define an intuitionistic version of the Limit Interpretation for Arithmetic.
We include below two intuitionistic properties of this notion of convergence that we use
in Section 5.
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Lemma 2.3. Let s be any weakly increasing sequence. Then: (a) if s has some upper bound
M ∈ N, then s is convergent; (b) if s has limit L ∈ N, then s is stationary.
Proof Hint. (a) Prove, by induction over M − s(n0), that if s(n) ≤ M for all n ≥ n0, then
s is convergent. Eventually, take n0 = 0.
(b) Check, by taking φ(n) = n, that s has value L at least once. Deduce that s is sta-
tionary from the first point it has value L.
Convergence principles. We consider now several principles, all of the form: all
“convergent” sequences have some stationary value or limit value. “Convergent” is taken
from different intuitionistic theories of convergence. In Section 5, we will check that they
are all equivalent to 2-Markov. Let F denote a generic recursive family of recursive
sequences over N .
¬-divergence and ¬¬-stationarity are the schemas
¬(s divergent ) ⇒ s stationary
¬¬(s stationary ) ⇒ s stationary
Both are quantified ∀s ∈ F . They say that any ¬-divergent (any ¬¬-stationary) sequence
has some stationary value.
Limit value is the axiom schema
s convergent ⇒ ∃L .(s has limit value L)
quantified ∀s ∈ F .
Contrapositive of Choice. A last principle related to 2-Markov is the Contrapositive of
Choice for recursive predicates. Let P(x, y, z) be any recursive predicate. We recall that
the Choice axiom for P is
(∀z) ∀x .∃y.P(x, y, z) ⇒ ∃ f.∀x .P(x, f (x), z).
The Contrapositive of Choice was defined in [4], by taking, in the Choice schema, the dual
both of the hypothesis and the thesis, and reversing the implication:
(∀z) ∃x .∀y.Q(x, y, z) ⇐ ∀ f.∃x .Q(x, f (x), z)
for any Q = ¬P , and P recursive (and thus for any recursive Q). We will check that the
Dual of Choice lies, intuitionistically, between 2-Markov and 1-EM.4
3. Equivalences with infinity axioms
In this section we start by proving the equivalences we claimed in Section 1. We
prove that the logical principles we considered for degree 2 formulas are in one-to-one
correspondence with the infinity axioms we considered.
We first explain how to express any Σ 02 statement as some statement asserting that a
given recursive set is finite. Fix any A(z) ∈ Σ 02 . Then A(z) = ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z), for some
recursive P . Fix some recursive coding 〈x, y〉 of pairs in N . Fix any n ∈ N . Define Yn as
4 We conjecture that the Dual of Choice is not equivalent to 2-Markov, neither to 1-EM.
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the set of all (codings of) pairs 〈a, b〉 such that ∀x ≤ a.∃y ≤ b.¬P(x, y, n). Define Xn as
the set of all 〈a, b〉 ∈ Yn such that 〈a, b′〉 ∈ Yn for no b′ < b. We call the family of sets
associated with each instance of A(z) X = {Xn}n∈N . X is a recursive family of recursive
sets.
Remark that if 〈a, b〉 ∈ Yn , then 〈a, b′〉 ∈ Xn for some b′(≤ b). For all a, there
is at most one b such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ Xn . And 〈a, b〉 ∈ Xn for some b if and only if
∀x ≤ a.∃y.¬P(x, y, n). We are now ready to prove:
Lemma 3.1 (Σ 02 and Finiteness). Let {Xn}n∈N be the family of sets associated with some
A(z) ∈ Σ 02 . Then, for all n ∈ N: Xn finite ⇒ A(n), while Xn infinite ⇒ A(n)⊥.
Proof. We have A(z) = ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z), for some recursive P .
Assume Xn is finite. Then there is a first x such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ Xn for no y. This implies
¬P(0, b0, n), . . . ,¬P(x − 1, bx−1, n) for some b0, . . . , bx−1. We have instead P(x, y, n)
for all y: otherwise, if we set bx = max(b0, . . . , bx−1, y), we would have 〈x, bx〉 ∈ Yn ,
and therefore 〈x, y ′〉 ∈ Xn for some y ′. In this case we conclude that ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, n),
that is, A(n).
Assume Xn is infinite. Let 〈a0, b0〉, . . . , 〈an, bn〉, . . . be any (recursive) listing of the
elements of Xn . Then all ai are pairwise distinct. Indeed, for all a there is at most one b
such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ Xn . Therefore ai = a j implies bi = b j , then 〈ai , bi 〉 = 〈a j , b j 〉, and
eventually i = j . Fix any x . Since a0, . . . , ax are x + 1 different values, for some i ≤ x
there is some ai ≥ x . By 〈ai , bi 〉 ∈ Xn , and the definition of Xn , there is some y ≤ bi such
that ¬P(x, y, n). This holds for all x . In this case we conclude that ∀x .∃y.¬P(x, y, z),
that is, A(n)⊥.
We may now prove the correspondences that we claimed between logical principles and
infinity axioms.
Lemma 3.2 (Infinity Axioms).
1. 2-EM ⇔ finite/Infinity axiom.
2. 2-König ⇔ Stolzenberg’s Principle.
3. 2-Markov ⇔ Not-Infinity axiom.
Proof.
1. ⇒. Assume 2-EM in order to prove finite/infinite. Fix any recursive set P . Set
Q(x, y) = (y < x ∨ ¬P(y)). Then “P finite” or “P infinite” is the instance of 2-EM
over Q.
⇐. Assume finite/infinite in order to prove 2-EM. Fix any Σ 02 formula A(z). By 3.1
there is some recursive family of recursive sets {Xz}z such that Xz finite ⇒ A(z), and
Xz infinite ⇒ A(z)⊥. Then from (Xz finite) ∨ (Xz infinite) we deduce A(z) ∨ A(z)⊥,
that is, 2-EM.
2. ⇒. Assume 2-König in order to prove Stolzenberg. Fix any recursive sequence
f : N → {0, 1}. Set Pi (x, y) = (y ≥ x ∧ f (y) = i). Then for all x, x ′
there is some y = max(x, x ′) ≥ x, x ′ such that f (y) = 0 or f (y) = 1. Thus,
∀x, x ′.(∃y.P0(x, y) ∨ ∃y.P1(x ′, y)). By 2-König, we deduce ∀x .∃y.Pi (x, y), for some
i = 0, 1. By definition, this is equivalent to {x | f (x) = i} is infinite, for some i = 0, 1.
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⇐. Assume Stolzenberg in order to prove 2-König’s. Fix any C(x, z) = ∃y.C ′(x, y, z)
and D(x, z) = ∃y.D′(x, y, z), both inΣ 01 . We assume: ∀x, y.C(x, z)∨D(y, z), in order
to prove: ∀x .C(x, z)∨∀y.D(y, z). Abbreviate A(z) = ∀x .C(x, z), B(z) = ∀y.D(y, z).
Then our thesis is A(z) ∨ B(z), with A(z), B(z) ∈ Π 02 . Let Uz, Vz be the recursive
sets associated with A(z)⊥, B(z)⊥ ∈ Σ 02 . By 3.1, Uz infinite implies (A(z)⊥)⊥(= A(z)),
and Vz infinite implies (B(z)⊥)⊥(= B(z)). By the Stolzenberg Principle, it is enough to
prove that Uz ∪Vz is infinite in order to deduce Uz infinite or Vz infinite, and A(z)∨B(z)
from this.
From ∀x, y.C(x, z) ∨ D(y, z) we deduce, by induction on n, that there are m, m′
such that: n = m + m′ − 1 and ∀x < m.C(x, z) and ∀x < m′.D(x, z). (Proof hint.
Start with n = −1, m = m′ = 0. Instantiate the hypothesis to C(m, z) ∨ D(m′, z).
If C(m, z), replace m with m + 1. If D(m′, z), replace m′ with m′ + 1. In both cases,
replace n with n + 1.) Fix any a; then set n = 2a. Either m > a, or m′ > a; otherwise
we would have m + m′ − 1 ≤ a + a + 1 = 2a − 1 < n. If m > a we deduce
∀x ≤ a.C(x, z), that is, ∀x ≤ a.∃y.C ′(x, y, z). If m′ > a, we deduce ∀x ≤ a.D(x, z),
that is, ∀x ≤ a.∃y.D′(x, y, z). In the first case we have 〈a, b〉 in Uz for some b, by
definition of Uz . In the second one, we have 〈a, b〉 in Vz for some b, by definition of Vz .
Thus, Uz ∪ Vz is infinite.
3. ⇐. Assume 2-Markov, P recursive and ¬(P infinite), in order to prove (P finite). By
2-Markov, it is enough to assume ¬ (P finite) and to derive a contradiction, say, that P
is infinite. 2-Markov implies 1-Markov. By 1-Markov, and the fact that (P finite) is Σ 02 ,
and 2.1, from ¬(P finite) we get (P finite)⊥, that is, (P infinite), contradiction.
⇒. Fix any Σ 02 formula A(z), and any recursive family of recursive sets Xz such
that Xz finite ⇒ A(z), and Xz infinite ⇒ ¬A(z). Then ¬¬A(z) ⇒ ¬(Xz
infinite) by contraposition. This latter implies (Xz finite) by ¬-infinite. We conclude
¬¬A(z) ⇒ A(z) by the choice of Xz .
4. Quasi-well-ordering principles and Dickson’s Lemma
In this section we study the relationships between various versions of Dickson’s Lemma
(restricted to recursive sequences), with 2-König, 1-EM. Different versions have different
strength, from an intuitionistic viewpoint.
In this section we abbreviate “minimum subsequence”, “infinite sequence”, “finite
base”, all of them with universal quantifiers restricted to recursive sequences, respectively
as MSrec, ISrec, FBrec.
Lemma 4.1 (Subsequence Lemma). Let (I,≤) be any recursive quasi-well-ordering.
1. Stolzenberg ⇒ MSrec.
2. MSrec ⇔ ISrec.
3. If I is some total ordering with at least two points: ISrec ⇔ 1-EM.
4. If I has at least two incomparable points, then: ISrec ⇔ Stolzenberg.
Proof.
1. Assume Stolzenberg, in order to prove MSrec. Fix any recursive sequence a = {an}n∈N
over I . We have to find some i such that ai ≤ a j for infinitely many j .
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Claim. There is some (in general, not recursive) subsequence a′ of a such that, for
all i , either a′i ≤ a′k for all k > i , or a′i ≤ a′k for no k > i .
Proof of MSrec from the Claim. By the definition of quasi-well-ordering, there are
i < j such that a′i ≤ a′j . By the assumption over a′ we have a′i ≤ a′k for all k > i . Since
a′ is a subsequence of a, there is some ani such that ani ≤ a j for infinitely many j .
Proof of the Claim. We use Dependent Choice. Let X be the set of infinite
recursive subsequences of a (they may be coded by integers). Define R(b, c) by: c
is a subsequence of b, and either b0 ≤ ci for all i , or b0 ≤ ci for no i . We have
a ∈ X . In order to apply Dependent Choice, we have to show that for all b ∈ X there is
some c ∈ X such that R(b, c). b is a recursive sequence, therefore by the Stolzenberg
Principle either b0 ≤ bi for infinitely many i , or ¬(b0 ≤ bi) for infinitely many i . In the
first case we choose c = the recursive subsequence of all bi such that b0 ≤ bi . In the
second case we choose c = the recursive subsequence of all bi such that ¬(b0 ≤ bi ).
If we apply Dependent Choice, we deduce that there is some (in general, not
recursive) sequence of recursive sequences a(0), a(1), a(2), . . ., such that either a(i)0 ≤
a
(i+1)
j for all j , or a(i)0 ≤ a(i+1)j for no j . Eventually, we define a′i = a(i)0 for all i . If
i < j , then a′j = a( j )0 belongs to some subsequence of a(i+1). If a(i)0 ≤ a(i+1)k for all k,
then a′i ≤ a′j , for all j > i . If a(i)0 ≤ a(i+1)k for no k, then a′i ≤ a′j for no j > i . We
deduce the Claim.
2. Assume MSrec, in order to prove ISrec. Fix any recursive sequence a = {an}n∈N over
(I,≤). Let X be the set of (integer codings of) finite weakly increasing subsequences
a′ = an0, . . . , ani of a, such that ani ≤ a j for infinitely many j > ni . LetR be the one-
step extension relation on finite sequences. We will check that we may apply Dependent
Choice to X ,R.
By MSrec, there is some a′ = an0 in X . Now fix any a′ ∈ X . Call the (recursive)
subsequence of all a j ≥ ani with j > ni , b. b is infinite by definition of X . By MSrec,
b has minimum bk for some k > ni . Let a′′ the result of adding bk to the end of a′.
Since bk is in b, we have a′′ weakly increasing. By the choice of bk , we have bk ≤ a j
for infinitely many j . Thus, a′′ ∈ X .
By Dependent Choice we conclude there is some chain of one-step extensions
a′, a′′, a′′′, . . . of elements of X . The union of all of them defines a weakly increasing
subsequence of a, as required.
Conversely, MSrec is a particular case of ISrec.
3. Assume I is some total ordering with at least two points. We have to prove (a): ISrec
⇒ 1-EM and (b): 1-EM ⇒ ISrec.
(a). By the assumptions: I total, and I has at least two points; there are p < q in
I. Choose any recursive predicate P(x, y), and fix any y. Define a recursive sequence
an = q if ¬P(x, y) for all x < n, and an = p if P(x, y) for some x < n. Then a is
weakly decreasing. Thus, any infinite weakly increasing subsequence a′ of a is constant.
If a′ is constantly q , then ∀x .¬P(x, y), while if a′ is constantly p, then ∃x .P(x, y). We
deduce 1-EM.
(b). By (2) above, it is enough to prove MSrec. We Claim: there is some z such that
∀t ≥ z.(sz ≤ st ).
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Proof of (b) from the Claim. sz is the minimum of the infinite subsequence
sz, sz+1, sz+2, . . ..
Proof of the Claim (by 1-EM and 2-Subsequence) By 1-EM, for all y we have
∃z ≥ y.sy > sz ∨ ∀t ≥ y.¬(sy > st ).
By I total, ¬(sy > st ) implies sy ≤ st . From the two previous remarks, and reasoning
by cases, we deduce that there is some z ≥ y, such that either sy > sz , or z = y and
sy ≤ st for all t ≥ y. By the Choice Axiom there is some (in general, not recursive) map
g such that, for all y: g(y) ≥ y, and either sy > sg(y), or g(y) = y and sy ≤ st for all
t ≥ y. Remark that in both cases we have sy ≥ sg(y). Set xi = gi(0). Define ui = sxi for
all i . Then, by the choice of xi , u is a weakly decreasing sequence, and for all i , either
ui > ui+1, or sxi ≤ st for all t ≥ xi . By the definition of quasi-well-ordering, there are
i < j such that ui ≤ u j . Since u is weakly decreasing, we have ui = ui+1 = · · · = u j .
Thus, sxi ≤ st for all t ≥ xi , for some xi .
4. Assume I is some ordering with at least two incomparable points p0, p1. By (1), (2)
above, we have only to prove ISrec⇒ Stolzenberg. Fix any f : N → 0, 1. Define
an = p f (n). Since p0, p1 are incomparable, any weakly increasing infinite subsequence
of a is constant. If a′ is constantly pi , then f has infinitely many i ’s.
About the intuitionistic strength of different versions of Dickson’s Lemma. By 4.1,
infinite subsequence for recursive sequences and N1 is equivalent to 1-EM, because N
is a total ordering with at least two points, 0 and 1.
Infinite subsequence for recursive sequences and Nh , with h > 1, is equivalent to
Stolzenberg, that is, to 2-König, because Nh for h > 1 has at least two incomparable
points, (0, 1, 1, . . .) and (1, 0, 0, . . .).
There is another version of DL: finite base for recursive sequences, or FBrec for short.
FBrec is equivalent to 1-EM both for h = 1 and for h > 1. The reason is that FBrec is
a Σ 02 statement. Thus, according to the Generalized Conservativity Result [2], if FBrec
is derivable classically then (1-EM ⇒ FBrec) is derivable intuitionistically. The reverse
implication follows by considering a finite base for any recursive sequence over (0, . . . , 0)
and (1, . . . , 1). According to whether the base includes also (0, . . . , 0), or only (1, . . . , 1),
we may decide whether the sequence contains also (0, . . . , 0), or only (1, . . . , 1). The
existence of such a decision procedure is equivalent to 1-EM.
5. 2-Markov, Convergence properties, Contrapositive of Choice
In this section we prove that 2-Markov is equivalent to the statements: ¬-divergence,
¬¬-stationarity (5.2.3), and to: every recursive convergent sequence is convergent to some
limit (5.3). For all definitions we refer the reader to Section 2.4. We also prove that the
Contrapositive of Choice for recursive predicates is between 2-Markov and 1-EM (5.5).




Lemma 5.1 (Stationarity and Σ 01 , Σ 02 ). Fix any A(z) = ∃x .P(x, z) ∈ Σ 01 , B(z) =
∃x .∀y.Q(x, y, z) ∈ Σ 02 . Then there are binary recursive sequences a(z, n), b(z, n), weakly
increasing in n, such that:
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1. a(z, .) has some limit ⇔ a(z, .) stationary ⇔ A(z) ∨ ¬A(z);
2. a(z, .) convergent, ¬¬ (a(z, .) stationary);
3. b(z, .) stationary ⇒ B(z);
4. b(z, .) divergent ⇒ B(z)⊥;
5. ¬¬B(z), 1-Markov ⇒ b(z, .) convergent.
Proof.
1. Define a(z, n) = 1 if ∃x ≤ n.P(x, z), and a(z, n) = 0 otherwise. Then a(z, .) is
weakly increasing. Thus, if a(z, .) has limit value L, then it is stationary by 2.3(b).
Assume a(z, .) is stationary from some n. Then a(z, n) = 1 implies P(x, z) for some
x . a(z, n) = 0, however, implies a(z, m) = 0 for all m ≥ n, and therefore ¬P(x, z)
for all x . Assume A(z) ∨ ¬A(z). If ∃x .P(x, z) then a(z, n) = 1 from x on, while if
¬∃x .P(x, z) then a(z, n) = 0 for all n. In both cases a(z, .) has some limit value.
2. a(z, .) is weakly increasing with upper bound 1; hence it is convergent by 2.3(a). ¬¬
(a(z, .) stationary) follows from (1) above, and the fact that the Excluded Middle is
intuitionistically not false. Indeed, for any A we have: ¬¬(A(z) ∨ ¬A(z)).
3. Define b(z, n) = the first x < n such that Q(x, y, z) for all y < n, if any, with
b(z, n) = n if there is none. Then b(z, .) is weakly increasing. Assume b(z, .) is
stationary from some x . For any y, set m = max(x, y) + 1 > x, y. By stationarity
we have b(z, m) = b(z, x). By definition of b, we have b(z, m) = b(z, x) ≤ x < m.
By definition of b(z, m) and m > y we conclude that Q(b(z, m), y, z) for all y. Thus,
∃x .∀y.Q(x, y, z).
4. If b(z, .) is divergent, then for all n there is some m > n such that b(z, n) = b(z, m).
Since b(z., ) is weakly increasing, b(z, n) < b(z, m). We deduce that for all x there
is some m such that x < b(z, m). By definition of b(z, m), for some y < m we have
¬Q(x, y, z), and this for all x .
5. Assume ¬¬B(z) and 1-Markov, in order to prove b(z, .) convergent. Fix any recursive
φ : N → N . We have to prove that b(z, .) is constant over [x, φ(x)] for some x ∈ N .
This is a Σ 01 statement because φ is recursive. By 1-Markov, it is enough to assume
that for all x there is some y ∈ [x, φ(x)] such that b(z, x) = b(z, y), and derive a
contradiction. The assumption implies b(z, .) divergent; hence B(z)⊥ by the previous
point, and therefore ¬B(z). This contradicts ¬¬B(z).
We will now prove the first goal of this section: ¬-divergence and ¬¬-stationarity are
equivalent to 2-Markov.
Lemma 5.2 (¬-divergence, ¬¬-stationarity). Let s be any recursive sequence.
1. ¬¬-stationarity ⇒ 1-EM.
2. s not stationary ∧ 1-Markov ⇒ s divergent.
3. 2-Markov ⇔ ¬-divergence ⇔ ¬¬-stationarity.
Proof.
1. By 5.1, points (1) and (2), there is a recursive family of recursive sequences which are
¬¬-stationary, and whose stationarity is equivalent to 1-EM. By ¬¬-stationarity we
conclude 1-EM.
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2. By 1-Markov, the fact that (s stationary) is Σ 02 because s is recursive, and 2.1, from ¬(s
stationary) we deduce (s stationary)⊥, that is, (s divergent).
3. We prove, in this order, 2-Markov ⇒ ¬-divergence ⇒ ¬¬-stationarity ⇒ 2-
Markov.
(a) Assume 2-Markov. Assume s is recursive and not divergent, in order to prove that s
is stationary. The set of x such that s(x) = s(x +1) is not infinite (if it were, s would
be divergent). By 2-Markov and 3.2.3, this set is finite; hence it has a last element x .
s is stationary from x + 1.
(b) Assume ¬-divergence, and s recursive, ¬¬ (s stationary), in order to prove that
s is stationary. By ¬-divergence, it is enough to prove ¬(s divergent). Indeed, (s
divergent) is (s stationary)⊥. Therefore (s divergent) implies ¬(s stationary). By
taking the contrapositive, ¬¬(s stationary) implies ¬(s divergent).
(c) Assume ¬¬-stationarity. Fix any B(z) ∈ Σ 02 . Assume ¬¬B(z), in order to prove
B(z). Fix any recursive b(z, n) as in 5.1, point (3). It is enough to prove that b(z, .)
is stationary. By ¬¬-stationarity, it is enough to assume that b(z, .) is not stationary
and to derive a contradiction. For, we first derive 1-EM; hence 1-Markov, by (1)
above. By (2) above, from b(z, .) not stationary, we deduce that b(z, .) is divergent.
By 5.1.4, we get B(z)⊥ ; hence ¬B(z), contradicting ¬¬B(z).
We now study the relationship between stationarity and convergence for recursive
sequences, then we find another equivalent for 2-Markov.
Lemma 5.3 (Convergence and ¬¬-stationarity). Fix any recursive sequence s over N.
1. (s stationary) ⇒ (s convergent);
2. (s convergent) ∧ 1-Markov ⇒ ¬¬ (s stationary).
In particular, stationarity and convergence for recursive sequences are classically
equivalent.
Proof.
1. If for some n and all m ≥ n we have s(n) = s(m), then for any recursive map
φ : N → N and all m in [n, φ(n)] we have s(n) = s(m).
2. Assume 1-Markov. Assume s is convergent, but not stationary, in order to derive a
contradiction. If s is not stationary, then by 1-Markov and Lemma 5.2, point (2), s is
divergent. Define a recursive map φ(n) = the first m ≥ n such that s(n) = s(m) (there
is one by divergence). By definition, for all n, s(n) = s(φ(n)). Thus, s is constant in no
interval of the form [n, φ(n)]. This contradicts the hypothesis that s is convergent.
Lemma 5.4 (Limit Value). 2-Markov ⇔ every recursive convergent sequence has some
limit value.
Proof. ⇒. Assume 2-Markov. 2-Markov implies 1-Markov. By 5.3 and 1-Markov, every
recursive convergent sequence is ¬¬-stationary. By 2-Markov, it is stationary. In particular,
it has some limit.
⇐. Conversely, assume that all recursive convergent sequences have a limit. Fix any
B(z) ∈ Σ 02 . Assume ¬¬B(z) in order to prove B(z). Then all convergent sequences a(z, .)
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defined in 5.1 have some limit. We deduce 1-EM, and in particular 1-Markov. Thus, the
weakly increasing sequence b(z, .) we associated with B(z) in 5.1.5 is convergent. By
assumption, it has some limit x0. Since b(z, .) is weakly increasing, it is stationary by
2.3(b). We conclude B(z) by 5.1.3.
We conclude the paper by deriving that the Contrapositive of Choice is between
2-Markov and 1-EM.
Lemma 5.5 (Contrapositive of Choice).
1. 2-Markov ⇒ Contrapositive of Choice.
2. Contrapositive of Choice ⇒ 1-EM.
Proof.
1. Assume 2-Markov and ∀ f.∃x .P(x, f (x), z), in order to prove A(z) = ∃x .∀y.P(x, y, z).
By 2-Markov, it is enough to prove ¬¬A(z). We assume ¬A(z), in order to derive a con-
tradiction. 2-Markov implies 1-Markov, and A(z) is Σ 02 . Thus, from ¬A(z) and 2.1, we
deduce A(z)⊥: for all x there is some y such that ¬P(x, y, z). Define f (x) = the first y
such that ¬P(x, y, z). By assumption, we have P(x, f (x), z) for some x , contradicting
the definition of f .
2. Assume the Contrapositive of Choice. Fix any A = ∃x .P(x, z) ∈ Σ 01 , in order
to prove A(z) ∨ A(z)⊥. We first remark that for all f there is some x such that
P(x, z)∨¬P( f (x), z). Indeed, by decidability of P we get ¬P( f (0), z)∨ P( f (0), z).
In the first case we deduce the thesis for x = 0, in the second one, for x = f (0). If
we apply the Contrapositive of Choice, we get ∃x .∀y.P(x, z) ∨ ¬P(y, z). If P(x, z)
we deduce ∃x .P(x, z); if ¬P(x, z) we deduce ∀y.¬P(y, z). In both cases we conclude
1-EM.
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